Epistemische Notationen ist als Bezeichnung einer Schreibweise wie viele andere in der Philosophie gebräuchlichen Darstellungsmöglichkeiten eine Ausdrucks- und Redeeinführung. Dieselbe steht für eine sprachstufen- und typentheoretische Beschreibungsaltemative, die sowohl mit natürlicher Sprache als auch mit logisch-mathematischen Kalkülen verträglich ist. Vier Merkmale haben besonderes Gewicht: 1. E-Notationen (= Epistemische Notationen) sind wirklichkeitsrepräsentativ; 2. mengentheoretisch; 3. typentheoretisch; 4. sprachstufentheoretisch. Die durch Kombination dieser Charakteristika entstehende „Abstraktionszange" erlaubt es, normalsprachlich nicht faßbare „Interpretationskonstrukte" zu,,lokalisieren". Die Entstehungsgeschichte der,,Epistemischen Notationen" ist daher eng mit der Theorie (...) der Antinomienbildung verknüpft. Insofern ist dieser approach auch für antinomientheoretische Untersuchungenbesonders geeignet. Die sprachanalytische Verwendbarkeit dieses Ansatzes ist jedoch so allgemein, daß sich damit eine ganze Reihe schwer faßbarer philosophischer Probleme auf neue Weise analysieren lassen. Vor allem sind es Fragen der Bedeutung, Außersprachlichkeit und Selbstbezüglichkeit, die Begriffe wie,,exakt", „genau" oder „beweisbar" ins Licht einer zwar ungewohnten, aber kritisch befruchtenden Perspektive rücken. Epistemische Notationen sind deshalb ein erster Schritt zu einer realistischeren Einschätzung unserer künftigen philosophischen Möglichkeiten. (shrink)

Epistemische Notationen ist als Bezeichnung einer Schreibweise wie viele andere in der Philosophie gebräuchlichen Darstellungsmöglichkeiten eine Ausdrucks- und Redeeinführung. Dieselbe steht für eine sprachstufen- und typentheoretische Beschreibungsaltemative, die sowohl mit natürlicher Sprache als auch mit logisch-mathematischen Kalkülen verträglich ist. Vier Merkmale haben besonderes Gewicht: 1. E-Notationen (= Epistemische Notationen) sind wirklichkeitsrepräsentativ; 2. mengentheoretisch; 3. typentheoretisch; 4. sprachstufentheoretisch. Die durch Kombination dieser Charakteristika entstehende „Abstraktionszange" erlaubt es, normalsprachlich nicht faßbare „Interpretationskonstrukte" zu,,lokalisieren". Die Entstehungsgeschichte der,,Epistemischen Notationen" ist daher eng mit der Theorie (...) der Antinomienbildung verknüpft. Insofern ist dieser approach auch für antinomientheoretische Untersuchungenbesonders geeignet. Die sprachanalytische Verwendbarkeit dieses Ansatzes ist jedoch so allgemein, daß sich damit eine ganze Reihe schwer faßbarer philosophischer Probleme auf neue Weise analysieren lassen. Vor allem sind es Fragen der Bedeutung, Außersprachlichkeit und Selbstbezüglichkeit, die Begriffe wie,,exakt", „genau" oder „beweisbar" ins Licht einer zwar ungewohnten, aber kritisch befruchtenden Perspektive rücken. Epistemische Notationen sind deshalb ein erster Schritt zu einer realistischeren Einschätzung unserer künftigen philosophischen Möglichkeiten. (shrink)

Is 'n transendentale kritiek religieus bepaald? deur V. Brümmer. -- Constitution and creativity in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, by A. L. Conradie. -- Studium Generale, deur H. J. De Vleeschauwer. -- Sociology of law and its philosophical foundtions, by H. Dooyeweerd. -- Beginvrae en antwoorde in der Wysbegeerte, deur P. G. W. Du Plesis. -- Max Scheler's concern with the highest perfection, by S. I. M. Du Plessis. -- Christelike wetenskap, highest perfection, by S. I. M. Deu Plessis. -- (...) Christelike wetenskap, deur B. Duvenage. -- Malan's critical study, by H. Hart. -- Raakpunte vir 'n dialoog met 'n Christelike Wysbegeerte, deur A. M. T. Meyer. -- Nuwe gedagtes oor die begrip Natuurwet, deur A. H. Murray. -- Die voorwaardes vir die uitbou van 'n wysgerige antropologie, deur C. K. Oberholzer. -- De structuur van feit-en-betekenis, deur K. J. Popma. -- The relation of the arts to the presentation of the truth, by C. G. Seerveld. -- Gezag en vrijheid in het licht van Gods Woord, deur J. Stellingwerff. -- Voorveronderstellings vir 'n filosogie van die opvoeding, deur J. A. L. Taljaard. -- Objektiwiteit, sekularisasie en geskiedenis, deur N. T. Van der Merwe. -- Etiek: wetenskap van relasies, deur S. P. Van der Walt. -- Wetten en feiten, deur C. A. Van Peursen. -- Enige opmerkingen over entiteiten, deur H. Van Riessen. -- Richard Kroner on Herman Dooyeweerd, by C. Van Til. -- De mens in de taalkunde, deur P. A. Verburg, -- Enkele motieven van het anti-militair pacifisme, deur S, U. Zuidema. -- Publications of prof. dr. H. G. Stoker. Publikasies van prof. dr. H. G. Stoker (p. 303-311). (shrink)

Introducing students to the core philosophical issues surrounding modern physics and the ideas, which have shaped our current understanding of the subject, the book is based on lectures by H. W. Watson and sets out to illuminate and implicate the inextricably entwined nature of philosophy and physics and the importance of logic.

W. H. Walsh; XII—Historical Causation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 63, Issue 1, 1 June 1963, Pages 217–236, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristote.

W. H. Walsh; XII—Historical Causation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 63, Issue 1, 1 June 1963, Pages 217–236, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristote.

Goldstein attempts to establish a middle position between the idealist and the realist arguments concerning truth and fact in history. Though fact serves as the touchstone of truth, we cannot verify propositions, especially historical propositions, in terms of fact. Nowell-Smith argues that Goldstein cannot acknowledge the importance of reality for everyday affairs, while denying its importance in history. Goldstein could have avoided such problems by realizing that if he is an opponent of historical realism, he must be a supporter of (...) historical idealism. He could resolve Nowell-Smith's objections by adopting the Kantian argument which contrasts two types of judgment; judgment proper and particular attempts at judgment. Statements of objective fact, including historical facts, would be considered judgment proper. This would still allow for some judgments which did not fulfill objective criteria, but could count as knowledge. (shrink)

Hume's explicit pronouncements about truth are few and unenlightening. In a well-known passage near the beginning of Book III of the Treatise he writes that ‘Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact.’ Hume's main concern in this passage, however, is not with the concept of truth, but with his thesis that moral distinctions are not derived (...) from reason: he introduces his reference to truth only with a view to showing that our ‘passions, volitions and actions … being original facts and realities, complete in themselves,’ are not susceptible of the agreement and disagreement spoken of, and therefore cannot be said to be true or false, in conformity with or contrary to reason. The account of truth given here is not elaborated, and perhaps not even thought to need elaboration. Similarly with another passage a few pages earlier in which Hume says that ‘Truth is of two kinds, consisting either in the discovery of the proportions of ideas, considered as such, or in the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence’. Here again his interest is not in truth itself but in ‘curiosity, or the love of truth,’ the passion which, Hume says, ‘was the first source of all our inquiries’. Hume seems to take it for granted that nothing more needs to be said about what it is to discover ‘the proportions of ideas, considered as such,’ or about the circumstances in which we can speak of there being ‘conformity’ or the lack of it between our ideas of objects and their real existence. So far as he is concerned the central point to grasp is the distinction between propositions which have to do with relations of ideas and those which express, or purport to express, matters of fact. Once this distinction is clear, the nature of truth is supposed to be plain. (shrink)

Hume's explicit pronouncements about truth are few and unenlightening. In a well-known passage near the beginning of Book III of the Treatise he writes that ‘Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact.’ Hume's main concern in this passage, however, is not with the concept of truth, but with his thesis that moral distinctions are not derived (...) from reason: he introduces his reference to truth only with a view to showing that our ‘passions, volitions and actions … being original facts and realities, complete in themselves,’ are not susceptible of the agreement and disagreement spoken of, and therefore cannot be said to be true or false, in conformity with or contrary to reason. The account of truth given here is not elaborated, and perhaps not even thought to need elaboration. Similarly with another passage a few pages earlier in which Hume says that ‘Truth is of two kinds, consisting either in the discovery of the proportions of ideas, considered as such, or in the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence’. Here again his interest is not in truth itself but in ‘curiosity, or the love of truth,’ the passion which, Hume says, ‘was the first source of all our inquiries’. Hume seems to take it for granted that nothing more needs to be said about what it is to discover ‘the proportions of ideas, considered as such,’ or about the circumstances in which we can speak of there being ‘conformity’ or the lack of it between our ideas of objects and their real existence. So far as he is concerned the central point to grasp is the distinction between propositions which have to do with relations of ideas and those which express, or purport to express, matters of fact. Once this distinction is clear, the nature of truth is supposed to be plain. (shrink)